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Abstract
The purpose of the present research was to examine Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false
memory for trauma-related and nontrauma-related lists in adolescents and adults with and without
documented histories of child sexual abuse (CSA). Individual differences in psychopathology and
adult attachment were also explored. Participants were administered free recall and recognition
tests after hearing CSA, negative, neutral, and positive DRM lists. In free recall, CSA and
negative lists produced the most false memory. In sharp contrast, for recognition, CSA lists
enjoyed the highest d’ scores. CSA-group adolescents who evinced greater PTSD symptoms had
higher rates of false memory compared to: 1) nonCSA-group adolescents with higher PTSD
symptom scores (free recall), and 2) CSA-group adolescents with lower PTSD symptom scores
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(recognition). Regression analyses revealed that individuals with higher PTSD scores and greater
fearful-avoidant attachment tendencies showed less proficient memory monitoring for CSA lists.
Implications for trauma and memory development and for translational research are discussed.
The effects of childhood trauma on memory have been much debated (e.g., Goodman, Quas,
& Ogle, 2010; Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006; Loftus, Garry, & Feldman, 1994; Pezdek &
Banks, 1996). Recently this debate has concentrated on false memory as indexed by the
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task (Gallo, 2010; Pezdek & Lam, 2007). Traditionally,
the DRM paradigm involves presenting participants with positive and neutral as well as
some vaguely negative word lists, with each list semantically related to a “critical lure” (CL)
– that is, a word that was not actually presented. On subsequent memory tests, participants
often falsely remember the CLs as having been presented amidst the associated words. For
instance, in a well-known study by Roediger and McDermott (1995), participants were first
presented with a word list including bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket,
doze, and slumber. When later asked to remember the words, participants often
spontaneously--and falsely--reported the CL, sleep, as having been presented in the original
list. Confidence ratings on such tasks have further demonstrated that adults are surprisingly
confident that the CLs were actually presented (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Backward
associative strength (BAS), along with familiarity and meaningfulness, are particularly
robust predictors of the DRM effect (Brainerd, Yang, Reyna, Howe, & Mills, 2008;
Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). Roediger and McDermott's 1995 article
quickly became a classic, generating a deluge of research (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci,
2008a; Gallo, 2006, 2010; Ghetti, Qin, & Goodman, 2002; Howe, Cicchetti, Toth, &
Cerrito, 2004).
These studies are important to a scientific understanding of false memories for semantically
associated word lists. The findings support the possibility that the human mind reconstructs
reality, sometimes producing false memories and beliefs, even when simply processing lists
of words. Because robust false-memory effects (in both recall and recognition) can be
reliably obtained under conditions of precise experimental control, researchers have relied
on the DRM task to address important questions about false memories in adults and children
(Brainerd et al., 2008a; Gallo, 2006; Howe, 2007).
However, we know of no developmental studies that have examined DRM false memory for
trauma-related lists in child sexual abuse (CSA) victims. Due to heated debates about
memory for trauma-related information and about the applicability of DRM findings to legal
cases, especially concerning victims of CSA, it was of interest to determine if such victims
would show reduced or exaggerated DRM false memory effects. Thus, the purpose of the
present research was to examine DRM false memory for trauma-related and nontrauma-
related lists in adolescents and adults with and without documented CSA histories.
Individual differences in psychopathology and attachment were also explored.
Developmental Differences in DRM Performance
DRM performance has been investigated developmentally in several studies (e.g., Brainerd,
Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Ghetti et al., 2002; Howe, 2007; see Brainerd et al., 2008a, for a
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review). Although contradictory findings exist regarding whether children are more or less
susceptible than adults to false memories on the DRM task, the majority of published studies
report that adults are more prone than children to DRM false memory effects. Children's
false memories, like those of adults, involve activation of associative relations (Howe,
Wimmer, & Blease, 2009). The extent to which the developmental trend is explained by
simple associative relations versus deficits in gist memory for children is currently under
debate (Brainerd et al., 2008a; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009). Although
adolescents would be expected to have gist memory functioning largely equivalent to that of
adults, which could equalize the occurrence of DRM false memory across age, adolescents
may not have the same extent of associative strength as adults for trauma-related lists,
resulting in greater false memory for adults than adolescents when presented with such lists.
One possible exception could be that CSA experience may provide adolescent victims with
relatively tight semantic relations for trauma-related material (Foa & Kozak, 1986).
Alternatively, lack of sufficient memory monitoring has been identified as a key component
of the DRM false memory effect (Gallo, 2006). If adolescents’ memory monitoring skills
(e.g., source monitoring abilities) are still developing, they may exhibit greater DRM false
memory than adults (Ghetti et al., 2002).
In any case, there is currently a paucity of developmental DRM research that compares the
performance of traumatized children and adults. In one particularly relevant study, Howe et
al. (2004) tested 5- to 12-year-old maltreated children and nonmaltreated controls on the
DRM task using standard Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists. There were no significant
differences in DRM false memory as a function of maltreatment status. The authors
commented that future research should include trauma-related DRM lists to determine if
maltreatment or developmental differences would then emerge. The present study addressed
that suggestion.
DRM, Emotional Lists, and Development
Several recent studies have examined DRM performance when adults and/or children are
exposed to emotional lists (e.g., Howe & Derbish, 2010). It has been hypothesized that
DRM false memory might be less apparent for lists that activate negative than positive
emotional themes because people pay particularly close attention to negative information
and thus engage in more “item-specific” processing of negative lists; item-specific
processing reduces DRM false memory effects (e.g., Palmer & Dodson, 2009). According to
this view, developmental differences in false memory might be attenuated or nonexistent for
negative lists due to greater item-specific processing regardless of age. However, others
have contended that negative valence activates “gist” or meaning processing to a greater
extent than does positive or neutral information, making it more difficult to differentiate
negative target and distractor words at test. In effect, the claim is that negative valence is an
especially salient gist. To the extent that, with age, gist processing tendencies increase, it
follows that adults should show a stronger false memory effect than children especially for
negative lists compared to, for example, positive lists (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, &
Toglia, 2010).
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However, empirically, findings vary as to whether more false memory occurs for negative
versus neutral or positive lists, whether age and emotional list type interact, or whether
effects simply reflect changes in response bias. To wit, several studies find that false
memory is more likely for negative than neutral and/or positive DRM lists. For example,
Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, and Wimmer (2010) examined the role of valence in
children's (5- to 11-year-olds) and adults’ true and false memories using the DRM paradigm.
Children's and adults’ true recall and recognition were best for neutral compared to negative
items. Concerning false memory, although false recall was higher for neutral compared to
negative items, false recognition was higher for negative compared to neutral items.
Although the findings were thus rather mixed, they were partly consistent with the idea that
negative emotional information is semantically denser than neutral information, resulting in
greater false memory at least on recognition tests (see also Howe, 2007)
Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, and Reyna (2008) and Brainerd et al. (2010) also
report greater likelihood of false memory for negative than non-negative lists. They
examined DRM false memory on recognition tasks in adults and children, respectively, who
were presented with negative and positive lists (with arousal held constant). False memory
was highest for negative lists, especially with age. The authors concluded, based largely on
Brainerd and Reyna's (1998) fuzzy trace theory, that for lists of negative valence, false
memory increases because the perceived meaning overlap between false and true items
increases and that this problem is exacerbated for adults compared to children because adults
are better at abstracting gist. Also, for negative lists, it was inferred that participants were
less able to use verbatim memories of true items to suppress errors.
In contrast to these findings, Palmer and Dodson (2009) reported less false memory for
emotional than neutral DRM lists. Adult participants viewed negative, positive, and neutral
lists of semantic associates matched on BAS. Neutral lists resulted in the highest false and
true recall rates. The results suggest that emotional words decrease false memories by
encouraging item-specific processing, which impairs the acquisition of relational
information and/or the spread of activation to the critical lure (see also Pesta, Murphy, &
Sanders, 2001). Moreover, emotional lures are likely more distinctive than non-emotional
lures; adults and children are less likely to false alarm to distinctive items (e.g., Ghetti et al.,
2002).
Finally, response bias is an important consideration in the DRM false memory effect
generally, including for emotional lists. Budson et al. (2006) examined DRM true and false
memory for negative versus neutral lists in younger and older adults. (Of interest here are
the older adults in their sample who did not suffer from dementia.) Critical lures for the
negative lists included such words as rape, sick, hungry, hell, and danger; critical lures for
the neutral lists included, for example, slow, sleep, fruit, foot, and sweet. A significant effect
of emotion for true memory but not false memory emerged. For true recognition, younger
and older adults were more likely to correctly recognize studied emotional versus non-
emotional words. For false recognition, a significant effect of emotion failed to emerge.
However, response bias best explained the findings; adults were more liberal in their
responses to emotional compared with non-emotional items regardless of whether they were
studied or nonstudied, and if nonstudied, regardless of whether they were related to the
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studied items or not. These results suggest that studying emotionally charged items may
shift participants’ response bias to a more liberal one for all emotional items at test—not just
the ones related to the study lists. Although one possible explanation for this effect is that
gist representations of emotional word lists are more robust and/or broader than those of
non-emotional word lists, the data are alternatively compatible with Windmann and
Krueger's (1998; see also Windmann & Kutas, 2001) proposal that emotion biases
recognition memory at an unconscious and automatic stage to facilitate processing of
potentially threatening stimuli relative to neutral ones. This facilitation in processing may
lead to enhanced fluency and a sense of familiarity, thereby increasing the likelihood of an
incorrect “old” response.
Thus, results from DRM studies are mixed, with some researchers finding more false
memory for negative lists and others finding more false memory for non-negative lists.
Moreover, there are hints in the literature that findings may vary for recall versus
recognition when emotional DRM lists are employed (Howe & Malone, 2010). Further
research is clearly warranted to disentangle the effects of different emotions on true and
false memory in the DRM paradigm.
DRM, CSA History, and Trauma-Related Psychopathology
Previous investigations of DRM performance in adults who report histories of CSA indicate
that adults with CSA histories typically make more errors than nonabused controls,
especially if the victims reach diagnosis for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD;
Bremner, Shobe, & Kihlstrom, 2000; Zoellner, Foa, Brigidi, & Przeworski, 2000; see also
Brennen, Dybdahl, & Kapidžić, 2007). Individuals with trauma histories may have memory
monitoring problems that make them more susceptible to false memory errors. However,
another body of research indicates that adults and teenagers with maltreatment histories,
especially if they have symptoms of PTSD, actually have better memories for trauma-related
information than do matched nonabused controls and better memory for trauma-related
information than for nontrauma-related information (Alexander et al., 2005; McNally,
Metzger, Lasko, Clancy, & Pitman, 1998; Vrana, Roodman, & Beckham, 1995). Thus,
although CSA victims might be prone to memory errors regarding positive and neutral
information, their trauma history could potentially enhance memory (or promote resistance
to false memory) for trauma-related stimuli. To test this hypothesis, we examined DRM
false memory performance in individuals with known histories of CSA compared to a
nonCSA control sample, using new trauma-related and nontrauma-related DRM lists.
PTSD is comorbid with several other types of emotional problems, such as dissociation and
depression. Moreover, these emotional problems are associated with memory errors on a
variety of tasks (e.g., Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, & Clayton, 2007; Hertel, 2000).
Dissociative symptoms have been specifically associated with DRM task memory errors.
For example, individuals with greater dissociative tendencies are more prone to DRM
memory monitoring errors, such as intrusion errors for nonpresented, nonCL words (e.g.,
Clancy, Schacter, McNally, & Pitman, 2000; Wilkinson & Hyman, 1998; Winograd, Peluso,
& Glover, 1998). However, other studies have found no such relations (e.g., Bremner et al.,
2000; Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, van Heerden, & Merckelbach, 2005; Jelinek, Hottenrott,
Goodman et al. Page 5






















Randjbar, Peters, & Moritz, 2009; see Gallo, 2006, for review). Given that indices of
psychopathology are often intercorrelated, it is important to take general psychopathology
into account when examining CSA and DRM false memory.
Adult Attachment and DRM False Memory
Possible associations between adult attachment styles and DRM false memory are also of
interest. Adult attachment styles have been related to memories of early childhood and
intimate partner events, suggesting that the encoding or retrieval of such memories may
activate the attachment system (e.g., Simpson, Roles, & Winterheld, 2010). For example, it
is more difficult for adults with avoidant attachment tendencies to access negative emotional
experiences from childhood, whereas adults with ambivalent attachment proclivities access
these kinds of experiences easily (Edelstein, 2006; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995). Consistent
with attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969), adults and adolescents with avoidant attachment
styles, like their child counterparts, may attempt to suppress physiological and emotional
reactions to avoid activation of the attachment system (e.g., Fraley, Garner, & Shaver,
2000).
Qin, Ogle, and Goodman (2008) examined the relation between adult attachment and DRM
performance. Adult attachment orientation predicted DRM false memory when the original
Roediger and McDermott lists were employed (e.g., higher security predicted greater DRM
false memory for gist information, whereas higher fearful avoidance scores predicted less
false memory for gist information). Perhaps more secure individuals embody positive mood
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), and a more positive mood contributes to gist processing
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005). This may result in greater spontaneous false memory as elicited
on the DRM task. However, Qin et al. (2008) also found that avoidant attachment (both
fearful and dismissing), at least in parents, was associated with indices related to greater
DRM false memory in adult offspring. The latter findings are consistent with research
indicating greater memory error in adults with insecure attachment (Chae, Ogle, &
Goodman, 2009). Given that CSA lists may activate attachment issues, it was of interest to
examine relations between attachment and DRM false memory for CSA lists as well as for
other list types.
The Present Experiment
The main goal of the current research was to administer trauma-related and nontrauma-
related DRM word lists as well as cognitive and mental health measures to adolescents and
adults with and without documented CSA histories. First, it was predicted that, with BAS
controlled, participants would exhibit less false memory for CSA lists than other list types.
This prediction was based on the fact that CSA lists are distinctive, being high in arousal and
negative in valence, and that distinctiveness reduces DRM false memory through item-
specific processing (Ghetti et al., 2002; Kensinger, 2009; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999).
However, it was also possible that CSA lists, like other negative lists, would produce
stronger false memory effects due to tighter associative connections or stronger thematic or
gist activation (Howe et al., 2009ab, 2010; Brainerd et al., 2008b, 2010). Second, overall,
adolescents might be expected to produce fewer false memories than adults on the DRM
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task (e.g., Howe et al., 2009b). Although basic gist processing should be largely in place by
adolescence, associative relations for CSA content might increase with age due to familiarity
with the sexualized content. It was considered alternatively quite possible, however, that
memory monitoring deficits in adolescents relative to adults would result in less DRM false
memory with age. Third, overall, participants with a history of CSA were expected to
perform better (i.e., display fewer false memories) than participants with no known CSA
histories on trauma-related DRM lists but worse on nontrauma-related DRM lists (and thus
worse overall). The basis for this prediction was that CSA victims might overfocus on
trauma-related information, bolstering use of item-specific processing, whereas problems in
memory monitoring might be more apparent on nontrauma-related lists. This would result in
a significant CSA Status X List Type interaction. Moreover, such effects might be
particularly apparent for individuals with symptoms of PTSD, that is, individuals with
greater traumatization (McNally et al., 1998) and with younger age. Fourth, greater PTSD
symptomology and younger age were predicted to be associated with recall and/or
recognition of additional words that were not presented and that were not the CL, reflecting
deficits in memory monitoring. Finally, insecure attachment orientations were predicted to
be linked to greater DRM memory error.
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 93, 81 female) included 49 14- to 17-year-olds (M = 15.12 years, SD = .95)
and 44 18- to 37-year-olds (M = 21.43 years, SD = 4.77). The sample contained 58.1%
Caucasians, 21.5% African Americans, 8.6% Hispanics, 2.2% Asian Americans, and 9.7%
“other.” Twenty-five adolescents and 22 adults had histories of CSA.
Participants with CSA histories were primarily recruited from a child maltreatment
diagnostic/treatment center and district attorneys offices, although a few (n = 3) were
recruited from university Introductory Psychology classes. Control participants were
recruited from many sources (e.g., newspaper ads, internet ads, medical clinics, Introductory
Psychology classes; for the latter, n = 5). Controls were screened for CSA histories. In
soliciting nonabused controls, CSA was defined (e.g., fondling of genitals, penetration), and
adults and caregivers were asked not to participate or have their children participate,
respectively, if CSA had been experienced by the children. Although it is often impossible
to know for certain if a child has or has not experienced CSA, misclassification provides a
conservative test of the main hypotheses. Caregivers and children were required to have
lived together for 6 months or more, so that the caregivers could provide valid information
(e.g., on the mental health measures). None of the participants were in non-kinship foster
care or group homes.
The youngest children included were 14-years-old due to the sexual nature of the stimuli and
the standardization of psychopathology measures. All participants were English speaking
and free of such disorders as mental retardation, schizophrenia, and autism.
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Demographic questionnaire—The demographic questionnaire included questions about
age, gender, race/ethnicity, SES, and education. Information was also collected about foster
placements and therapy experiences (e.g., years in therapy).
Traumatic Events Screening Inventory for Children (TESI-C) and Trauma
Assessment for Adults (TAA)—The TESI-C (Ford & Rogers, 1997) is an 18-item
measure that assesses exposure to potentially traumatic experiences (e.g., severe accidents,
child abuse). The TESI-C is standardized for use with children as young as 7 years, but it is
also appropriate for adults reporting about childhood experiences. Caretakers completed the
TESI-C in relation to their adolescent children in the present study. The TAA (Resnick,
Best, Kilpatrick, Freedy, & Falsetti, 1993) is a similar measure for adults and includes
questions about potential traumas in adulthood. The TAA was administered to adults in the
present study. Both measures have high convergent validity values (i.e., .42 to .91). Test-
retest reliability correlations for TESI-C range from .81 to .85. Test-retest reliability values
for the TAA are also high (e.g., .80).
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children (WISC): Memory span and vocabulary subtests—The memory span
subtest of the WAIS (Wechsler, 1997) and WISC (Wechsler, 1991) requires participants to
repeat several series of numbers (of varying list length) both forwards and backwards. The
vocabulary section involves defining words. Reliabilities for these IQ subscales are high,
and the tests are well normed.
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) and the Adolescent Dissociative
Experiences Scale (ADES)—The DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) is a widely used
self-report measure that includes 28 questions designed to assess normal to pathological
dissociative experiences. The adolescent version, the ADES (Armstrong, Carlson, Putnam,
Libero, & Smith, 1997) measures psychological constructs such as dissociation, amnesia,
and depersonalization using age-appropriate item content. Adolescents indicate how
frequently they experience each of 30 items using an 11-point scale (0 = never, 10 =
always). Test-retest reliabilities for both measures range from .77 to .93, and both have been
used effectively to distinguish among abused, nonabused, and dissociative-disordered
children and adults.
Trauma Symptom Checklists: TSC-40 and TSC-C—The TSC-40 (Briere & Runtz,
1989) was administered to both adults and caretakers, and includes subscales for anxiety,
depression, dissociation, sexual abuse trauma index, sexual problems, and sleep disturbance,
as well as a total score. The TSC-C (Briere, 1996) is the downward extension, and is
appropriate for 8- to 15-year-olds. Subscales for this measure include anxiety, depression,
posttraumatic stress, sexual concerns, dissociation, and anger. Both measures are frequently
used in research and have good psychometric properties.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Scale (PDS) and the Child Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder Symptom Scale (CPSS)—The PDS (Foa, 1995) is a self-report
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questionnaire that provides a categorical PTSD diagnosis as well as a continuous measure of
PTSD severity and number of PTSD criteria met. The measure has been validated with
clinical interviews and other self-report trauma measures among individuals with a wide
range of trauma experiences (e.g., victims of natural disasters, assaults, war). The CPSS
(Foa, Johnson, Feeny, & Treadwell, 2001) is the child version of this scale and is
appropriate for children 8- to 18-years of age. Both the PDS and CPSS have high internal
consistency, good test-retest reliability, and demonstrated validity.
Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) and Young Adult Self Report (YASR)—The
CBCL (Achenbach, 1991) is a parent-report questionnaire that assesses maladaptive
emotional and behavioral problems in children ages 4 to 18. The YASR (Achenbach, 1997)
is the adult self-report version of this questionnaire and was administered to adult
participants. Scores for internalizing (i.e., anxious, depressive, and overcontrolled) and
externalizing (i.e., aggression, hyperactive, noncompliant, and undercontrolled) symptoms
and behavior from the CBCL and the YASR were analyzed. The psychometric properties of
the CBCL and YASR are exemplary for measures of this type.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for
Children (STAIC)—The STAI (Spielberger, Gorschuch, & Lushene, 1970) is a self-report
measure of anxiety for adults, and includes separate measures of state (S) and trait (T)
anxiety. The STAIC (Spielberger, Edwards, Montuori, Lushene, & Platzek, 1973) has been
successfully used with adolescents. These measures have good psychometric properties.
High scores indicate greater trait or state anxiety.
Experiences in Close Relationships Questionnaire (ECR)—The ECR (Brennan,
Clark, & Shaver, 1998) is a standardized 36-item self-report measure of attachment.
Participants respond to items using 7-point Likert (agree-disagree) scales that yield measures
of attachment-related anxiety and avoidance. The ECR is appropriate for use with adults and
adolescents. The reliability and construct validity of these scales have been demonstrated
extensively (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Sibley, Fischer, & Liu, 2005).
Children's Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ)—The CTQ (Bernstein, Ahluvalia, Pogge, &
Handelsman, 1994) is a standardized screening measure that identifies maltreatment
histories. Adults respond to 28 items using 5-point Likert scales. In the present study,
caretakers of adolescent participants completed a modified version of the CTQ in which
questions referred to the adolescents’ childhood experiences. The CTQ yields four main
factors: physical neglect, emotional neglect, emotional abuse, sexual abuse, and a
minimization score. The scale's reliability and validity have been demonstrated in adult
populations.
DRM lists—Forty DRM lists were included (10 each for CSA, positive, negative, and
neutral lists). Examples of CLs per category are: sex, rape, fondle (CSA); rich, loving, happy
(positive); ugly, kill, crash (negative), and foot, girl, window (neutral). Eleven of the original
DRM lists (Roediger et al., 2001) were used in the neutral (n = 10) and negative (n = 1)
categories, reducing the number of lists to be newly developed. For the lists we developed,
166 18- to 31-year-old undergraduates (105 females, M = 19.68 years, SD = 1.75) provided
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free associations to potential list items. The best 10 associates for each CL were selected
based on the sum of the BAS ratings, and frequency, age of acquisition, concreteness, and
familiarity ratings (MRC Psycholinguistic Database, 1987) to ensure the words were age-
appropriate and highly similar across these dimensions for lists within and across list type.
Traditionally, mean BAS has been considered the strongest predictor of a word list eliciting
false memory of a CL (Roediger et al., 2001; but see Brainerd et al., 2008a). The CSA lists
had significantly lower BAS ratings (M = .06, SD = .04) than the other lists (p < .05),
whereas the BAS ratings for the positive and negative lists (M = .14, SD = .06, and M = .13,
SD = .05, respectively) were quite comparable to those of neutral DRM lists developed by
Roediger and McDermott (1995), although BAS varies considerably even among the
standard neutral lists (e.g., from .06 to .20).
We also obtained ratings of valence and arousal for each list. Specifically, 30
undergraduates (15 females) rated the lists in terms of valence (1 = very negative; 5 = very
positive), and a separate group of 30 undergraduates (15 females) rated the lists in terms of
arousal (1 = not at all arousing, exciting, stimulating, and interesting; 5 = very arousing,
exciting, stimulating, and interesting), consistent with Bradley and Lang's (1994) rating
system. All raters indicated English as their first language. For each type of rating,
participants were presented with one of two random orders of the lists. Separate one-way
within-subject analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on the ratings to determine
list type differences. For valence, the main effect of list type was significant, F(3, 87) =
484.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .94. The valence means were as follows: Neutral, M = 3.27, SD = .
23; Positive, M = 4.48, SD = .28; Negative, M = 1.72, SD = .32; CSA, M = 2.50, SD = .30.
Pairwise comparisons revealed that all means significantly differed, ps < .001. As would be
expected, the negative and CSA lists were rated as particularly negative, and the positive
lists were rated as particularly positive. The CSA lists were likely not viewed as the most
negative because some of the words, such as kiss, have positive connotations in many
contexts. For arousal, the main effect of list type was also significant, F(3, 87) = 125.65, p
< .001, ηp2 = .81. The arousal means were as follows: Neutral, M = 1.74, SD = .41; Positive,
M = 2.93, SD = .67; Negative, M = 3.54, SD = .62; CSA, M = 3.78, SD = .57. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that all means significantly differed, ps < .01. Thus, the CSA lists
were rated as the most arousing, and the neutral lists were rated as the least arousing.
Despite statistical significance, the absolute mean difference in arousal ratings between the
CSA and negative lists was small.
To form the stimuli, associates for each CL were listed in order from strongest to weakest
associate. The 40 word lists were ordered using a random numbers table such that each word
list category (e.g., negative lists) did not appear more than twice in a row (see Block, 2008,
for details of list development).
Recognition test—The first and fifth associate from each list was selected to be included
in the recognition task. A distractor (a non-presented word not including the CL) was
selected for each associate and CL. The criteria for choosing distractors were as follows:
First, distractors were matched with their paired target words in terms of frequency,
concreteness, familiarity, and age of acquisition. Second, distractors were selected and
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matched by category (i.e., CSA, positive, negative, or neutral) according to valence when
possible.
Associates, CLs, and distractors (N = 240) were randomized using a random numbers table,
with several restrictions: First, associates and CLs could not be within 10 places of each
other, and words from each category (e.g., CSA, positive) could not repeat more than twice
consecutively. Finally, each distractor from a given list had to be five places or more away
from other distractors for that list.
Procedure
The study was approved by the university's Institutional Review Board. For participants who
met study criteria based on a telephone interview (e.g., age, absence of developmental
disability), a more thorough screening occurred at the experimental session. Participants
(adolescents and adults) were tested individually. Informed consent was obtained, as
appropriate per age group. Parents approved all lists before they were presented to
adolescents. Participants first completed a standard demographic questionnaire followed by
the ECR and IQ subscale tests. For the DRM task, participants heard the 40 DRM word lists.
Two random orders of the DRM word lists were created for purposes of presentation, with
the stipulation that no more than two lists in any one category could occur sequentially.
Because of its length, the DRM task was divided into two segments (each involving
presentation of 20 lists, five from each of the four list categories, and free recall and
recognition for those 20 lists). Participants performed free recall for 12 lists that differed
across the two versions and for 8 lists that were the same across the two versions. The two
segments were separated by a short break. Researchers who administered these tests were
blind to CSA status.
Within each segment, participants engaged in free recall after approximately half of the
word lists (9 to 11 of the 20 lists); within each of the two random orders of presentation,
random assignment was used to determine which lists the participants free recalled. In this
way, participants did not know whether, after each presentation of a list, they would be
asked to freely recall it, or simply to wait during the delay until the next list was presented.
Before the recognition test, participants completed the STAI or STAIC (in Segment 1,
participants completed the State scales; in Segment 2, participants completed the Trait
scales). Per segment, two recognition test orders were counterbalanced across participants
within each age group. Participants indicated “Yes” or “No” as to whether they believed the
word had been presented.
After the DRM task was completed, the following questionnaires were administered to
participants in two random orders: BDI/CDI, DES/ADES, CTQ, PDS/CPSS, YASR (for
adult participants), and the TSC-40/TSC-C. The TAA (adult participants only) and the
Negative Experiences Questionnaire were then administered. Caretakers completed the
demographic questionnaire, CBCL, CDC, CTQ, TESI-C, and Negative Experiences
Questionnaire, in that order. All participants were then debriefed. 1, 2, 3
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For the analyses, when measures differed across ages (e.g., for depression, PTSD), mean z
scores were created. Matching success was determined through a series of 2 (Age) X 2
(CSA status) ANOVAs (Table 1). There were no significant main effects or interactions for
SES, ethnicity (majority vs. minority), digit span (z scored), or vocabulary (z scored), Fs(1,
85-89) < 2.76. However, CSA, M = .30, SD = 1.03, and control, M = -0.30, SD = .87,
participants differed significantly in the number of PTSD criteria met (z scores), F(1, 89) =
10.15, p < .01, η2s = .10, and the Age X CSA interaction was significant as well, F(1, 89) =
4.21, p < .05, η2s = .05. Simple effects analyses revealed that CSA adolescents, M = .10, SD
= 1.11, and control adolescents, M = -.10, SD = .89, did not significantly differ, whereas as
CSA adults, M = .52, SD = .90, met a significantly greater number of PTSD criteria than did
control adults, M = -.52, SD = .82, F(1, 42) = 14.04, p <. 001. There were no other
significant simple effects. On the TSC (z scores), CSA participants, M = .31, SD = 1.11,
reported more sexual problems than did controls, M = -.32, SD = .74, F(1, 85) = 9.16, p <.
01, η2s = .10, greater dissociation (CSA, M = .40, SD = 1.03; control, M = -.41, SD = .79),
F(1, 89) = 17.19, p <. 001, η2s = .16; greater depression (CSA, M = .49, SD = 1.00; control,
M = -.49, SD = .71), F(1, 89) = 26.95, p <. 001, η2s = .24; and more anxiety (CSA, M = .40,
SD = 1.02; control, M = -.41, SD = .80), F(1, 86) = 17.79, p <. 001, η2s = .17. Analyses of
CBCL/YASR scores revealed significant main effects for CSA status both for internalizing
(CSA, M = .56, SD = 9.97; control, M = .47.23, SD = 10.15), and externalizing behaviors
(CSA, M = 56.38, SD = 9.73; control, M = .49.07, SD = 9.96), Fs(1, 84) > 11.30, ps < .001,
η2s = .12. In addition, for internalizing problems, there was a significant age main effect
(adolescents, M = 54.48, SD = 9.47; adults, M = .48.71, SD = 11.72), F(1, 84) = 6.10, p <.
05, η2s = .07. Moreover, a one-way ANOVA confirmed that there were no significant
differences in age for the CSA and control participants, F(1, 92) = 0.03.
Because a relatively large number of psychopathology measures was administered, the
number of variables was reduced through factor analysis using principal axis factoring with
oblique rotation (OBLIMIN with Kaiser normalization). PTSD was not included in the
1Several additional measures were administered (e.g., Big Five Inventory; John & Srivastava, 1999; Autobiographical Memory
Interview; Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989), and analyses of them will be reported in a separate paper. Preliminary analyses
confirmed that version did not significantly affect DRM performance with one exception. Free recall of nonassociates for neutral lists
was higher when the DRM task preceded the autobiographical memory task, M = 3.52, SD = 3.49, than vice versa, M = 2.13, SD =
1.50, F(1, 91) = 6.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .06. However, version did not interact with age, CSA status, or PTSD criteria met. The significant
finding may have reflected chance and is therefore not considered further.
2Forty-six undergraduates, all English-first language speakers, were presented with 20 of our DRM lists (5 per category), with the 20
lists counterbalanced as targets and distractors, followed by a recognition test, using the counterbalancing procedure for targets and
distractors as implemented by Roediger and McDermott (1995). The findings closely paralleled those for the present study (e.g.,
higher d’ for CSA lists).
3When nonBAS adjusted scores were analyzed, the basic findings were the same as reported for the BAS adjusted scores, with the
following exceptions: Free recall of the critical lure was higher for negative lists (M = .29, SD = .21) than for the CSA lists (M = .21,
SD = .21) and positive lists (M = .20, SD= .19), ps < .05, consistent with the proposal that negative valence promotes false memory
(the negative lists were rated as having more negative valence than the CSA lists). The mean for the neutral lists (M = .25, SD = .23)
did not differ from that of other list types. Free recall of associates was highest for neutral lists (M = .60, SD = .14) and lowest for
positive lists (M = .49, SD = .12) compared to the other list types (CSA, M = .56, SD = .14; negative lists, M = .56, SD = .12). On the
recognition test, CSA lists (M = .54, SD = .20) resulted in significantly fewer false alarms compared to the positive lists (M = .64, SD
= .23) and negative lists (M = .62, SD = .21). Neutral lists (M = .60, SD = .23) were not significantly different in false alarm rates from
other list types. Otherwise, the pattern of the results was the same as for the BAS adjusted scores (e.g., higher d’ for CSA lists).
However, use of BAS nonadjusted scores confounds BAS with list type.
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factor analysis because of its special status in relation to the hypotheses and PTSD's past
importance in predicting memory in maltreated samples. The factor analysis yielded two
factors with eigenvalues greater or equal to one. Using .40 as a cutoff for factor loadings, the
first factor included sexual concerns, dissociation, depression, and anxiety as measured by
the TSC/TSC-C, dissociation as measured by the DES/ADES, and trait anxiety as measured
by the STAI/STAI-C, and it yielded an alpha = .88. For each participant, a mean z score for
this “Psychopathology” scale was created (M = -.01, SD = .81). CBCL/YASR internalizing
and externalizing scores loaded on the second factor, but the factor did not yield adequate
reliability and thus the CBCL/YASR scores were considered separately. State anxiety as
measured by the STAI/STAI-C did not load adequately on either factor and was treated as a
separate variable.
Main Analyses
Hypotheses were tested through a series of ANOVAs and regression analyses. For free
recall and recognition, a series of 2 (Age: adolescents [14- to 18-year-olds] vs. adults) X 2
(CSA status: CSA vs. control) X 2 (PTSD: low vs. high criteria met) X 4 (List type: CSA,
negative, positive, neutral) mixed ANOVAs was conducted with list type as the only within-
subject factor. For recognition, a series of comparable ANOVAs was conducted on false
alarms to CLs, d’, and β scores. High versus low PTSD criteria was determined by a mean
split resulting in 48 participants in the high PTSD and 45 participants in the low PTSD
groups. The smallest cells in the ANOVAs contained at least five participants. For each
dependent measure regarding DRM memory (e.g., free recall of the CL, d’ score), “BAS
adjusted” scores were created by subtracting the mean BAS value for each list type from the
participants’ mean score for each list type. All analyses reported in the main text were based
on such scores.
Free recall—Free recall CL proportion scores (false recall of CLs) were created by
dividing CLs that were falsely recalled for a given list type by the total number of word lists
presented for a given list type. The main effect of list type was significant, F(3, 83) = 6.35, p
< .001, ηp2 = .19. The CSA and negative list CLs (Ms = .15 and .16, SDs = .20 and .21) were
significantly more likely to be recalled than positive list CLs (M = .06, SD = .19), ps < .001.
Recall of neutral list CLs (M = .11, SD = .23) did not significantly differ compared to that
for the other list types. Thus, in free recall, there was more false memory for CSA and
negative lists than for positive lists.
There was also a significant Age X CSA Status X PTSD interaction, Fs(1, 85) = 4.54, ps < .
05, ηp2s = .05. Means are presented in Table 2. Simple effect analyses revealed a significant
CSA Status X PTSD interaction for adolescents, Fs(1, 45) = 4.78, p < .05, ηp2 = .10. Simple
effects analyses showed that, for participants with a higher number of PTSD criteria met,
adolescents with CSA histories falsely recalled the critical lure more often than did control
adolescents with high PTSD symptoms, F( 1, 24) = 3.76, p < .05 (one-tailed test). There
were no other significant simple effects.
Proportion scores were calculated for number of correct associates recalled divided by the
number of correct associates potentially recallable for each list type. The main effect of list
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type was significant, F(3, 83) = 54.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .66: Recall for all lists types was
significantly different from one another with significantly higher recall for CSA list
associates compared to all other list types, and significantly lower recall for positive
associates compared to all other list types (CSA, M = .50, SD = .14; negative, M = .43, SD
= .12; neutral, M = .46, SD = .14; positive, M = .35, SD = .12; ps < .01). A significant main
effect of age emerged, F(1, 85) = 8.84, p < .01, ηp2 = .09: Adolescents (M = .41, SD = .08)
recalled fewer associates than did adults (M = .47, SD = .13). The number of additional
words recalled was also analyzed. There were no significant effects (CSA list, M = 2.10, SD
= 2.45; negative list, M = 2.42, SD = 2.77; neutral list, M = 2.71, SD = 2.79; positive list, M
= 2.52, SD = 2.59). Thus, in free recall, CSA associates were the most likely to be recalled, a
traditional developmental difference in memory for associates emerged, and no significant
differences were found for recall of additional words.
Recognitio—For the ANOVA for proportion of false alarms to CLs on the recognition
test, list type was not significant, F(3, 83) = 1.57 (CSA, M = .48, SD = .20; negative, M = .
49, SD = .21; neutral, M = .46, SD = .23; positive, M = .47, SD = .23). A significant CSA
Status X PTSD X Age interaction also emerged, F(1, 85) = 4.84, p < .05, ηp2 = .05 (Table
3). Simple effect analyses revealed that the PTSD X Age interaction was significant for CSA
participants, F(1, 43) = 6.57, p < .05, ηp2 = .13. CSA adolescents with high PTSD scores
false alarmed more often to the critical lure than CSA adolescents with low PTSD scores,
F(1, 23) = 4.71, p < .05, ηp2 = .17. No other simple effect analyses were significant.
Although the List Type X CSA Status X PTSD interaction was significant, F(3, 83) = 3.41,
p < .05, ηp2 = .11 (Table 4), all simple effect analyses were nonsignificant.
Next, d’ and β scores were calculated according to Wixted and Lee (n.d.). For calculating d’,
scores of zero and 1 were adjusted by 1/(2N) as suggested by Wixted; http://psy2.ucsd.edu/
~kang/sdt/sdt.htm). To create the d’ scores, hits to studied list items and false alarms to CLs
per list were compared. Preliminary analyses confirmed that overall mean d’ scores differed
significantly from zero, F(1, 91) = 59.44, p < .001, with zero indicating chance performance,
and that this was also true for the CSA lists, F(1, 91) = 48.39, p < .001; negative lists, F(1,
91) = 19.21, p < .001; neutral lists, F(1, 91) = 29.52, p < .001; and positive lists, F(1, 91) =
15.06, p < .001.
When d’ scores for each participant were entered into the ANOVA, there was a significant
main effect of list type, F(3, 83) = 15.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .15 (CSA, M = .66, SD = .84;
negative, M = .18, SD = .68; neutral, M = .35, SD = .86; positive, M = .15, SD = .71). CSA
lists enjoyed a higher d’ than did the other list types, ps < .05. Neutral lists had significantly
higher d’ scores than did negative and positive lists, ps < .05. Negative and positive list d’
scores did not significantly differ (pairwise comparisons). A significant List Type X CSA
Status X PTSD interaction also emerged, F(3, 83) = 4.08, p < .01, ηp2 = .05 (Table 5).
Simple effects analyses revealed a significant List Type X CSA Status interaction for
participants with high PTSD scores, F(3, 41) = 2.80, p =.05, ηp2 = .17, but not for those with
low PTSD scores, F(3, 44) = .44. The main effect of list type among control participants
with high PTSD scores was significant, F(3, 14) = 7.55, p < .05, ηp2 = .62. The pattern was
very similar across groups, however, with CSA having the highest d’ scores. Per group,
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there was a significant main effect of list type for CSA participants, F(3, 43) = 4.28, p < .01,
ηp
2 = .23, control participants, F(3, 42) = 10.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, participants with low
PTSD scores, F(3, 44) = 5.12, p < .01, ηp2 = .26, and participants with high PTSD scores,
F(3, 41) = 8.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .39.
β scores were calculated as a ratio, such that scores above 1.0 indicate a tendency to say
“no” (a conservative response criterion), scores below 1 indicate a tendency to say “yes” (a
liberal response criterion), and scores of 1.0 indicate no bias on the recognition test. There
was a significant CSA Status X PTSD X List Type interaction, F(3, 83) = 3.12, p < .05, ηp2
= .10 (Table 6). Simple effect analyses revealed a significant List Type X PTSD interaction
for control participants, F(3, 132) = 3.72, p < .05, as well as a significant List Type X CSA
Status interaction for participants with high PTSD scores, F(3, 129) = 5.15, p < .05. Of
interest, response bias was particularly low on CSA lists for participants with high PTSD
scores. However, further analyses of these interactions yielded no significant effects.
Correlations and regressions—Means for individual difference variables and main
dependent measures are presented in Table 7. Correlations of individual-difference variables
with the main dependent measures for CSA lists are presented in Table 8. Correlations
among individual-difference variables are presented in Table 9. Hierarchical regression
analyses were conducted to examine the unique contribution of individual difference
variables in predicting the various DRM dependent measures for CSA lists. The following
variables were entered: Step 1, age (as a continuous variable), CSA status, CBCL
externalizing T scores, attachment anxiety dimension, attachment avoidance dimension, and
PTSD criteria met; Step 2, attachment Anxiety X Avoidance interaction. Multicollinearity
prevented inclusion of other mental health variables (e.g., dissociation, Psychopathology,
CBCL internalizing T scores). There was only one significant model, which was for
additional words recalled from the CSA lists. The overall model for the first step was not
significant, F (6, 81) = 1.76, R2 = .12, but the overall model for the second step reached
significance, F (7, 80) = 2.53, p < .05, ΔR2 = .07. PTSD was a significant predictor, β = .15,
p < .05, as was the interaction of attachment anxiety score and attachment avoidance score, β
= .28, p < .05. Compared to individuals with fewer PTSD criteria met, individuals with a
greater number of PTSD criteria met recalled more additional words on the CSA lists. The
significant interaction is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, higher scores on both the
avoidance and anxiety dimensions of attachment (comparable to fearful avoidants in adult
attachment research) were associated with a higher level of free recall of additional words.
Thus, individuals with greater PTSD symptomology and those with stronger tendencies
toward fearful avoidance exhibited less proficient memory monitoring. The findings were
unchanged when interactions among the attachment variables and CSA status were added to
the regressions.
It was also of interest to determine if arousal or valence were better predictors of DRM
performance than BAS. As mentioned earlier, we had obtained ratings of valence and
arousal for the lists from groups of undergraduate students. The correlations of the valence
and arousal ratings, including with BAS, were nonsignificant: valence and arousal, r = -.28;
BAS and valence, r = -.08; BAS and arousal, r = .09. In separate hierarchical list-level
analyses, the DRM memory measures (e.g., free recall of the CL, recall of additional words,
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d’ scores) were each regressed on BAS (M = .17, SD = .13), valence (M = 3.06, SD = 1.25),
and arousal (M = 2.96, SD = .94) ratings on Step 1, with the Valence X Arousal interaction
entered on Step 2. Only the model for free recall of the CL was significant: Step 1, F(3, 29)
= 3.47, p < .05, R2 = .29; Step 2, F(4, 29) = 3.13, p < .05, δR2 = .05. BAS was the only
significant predictor, β = .46, p < .05.
Discussion
Our main goal was to examine DRM false memory for trauma-related and nontrauma-
related DRM lists in adolescents and adults with and without CSA histories. In this regard,
many studies based on the DRM paradigm are limited because the original DRM word lists
create false memories primarily for neutral words (e.g., flag). The few studies that have
examined DRM false memory for emotional lists have generally not focused on child sexual
abuse victims (but see Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, in press). Although the DRM paradigm has
been used to examine false memory in individuals with maltreatment histories (e.g., Howe et
al., 2004), it is important to investigate memory for trauma-related information in such
populations.
Several recent studies investigated DRM false memory for valenced word lists (e.g.,
Brainerd et al., 2008b, 2010; Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010). Howe (2007) proposed that,
compared to neutral word lists, negative word lists might induce more item-specific
processing and consequently less false memory, or alternatively, that the rich semantic inter-
relations of negative words might lead to increased false memory. Similarly, Brainerd et al.
(2008b, 2010) contended that negative compared to neutral and positive DRM lists are more
likely to activate gist processing, leading to more false memory for the former than the
latter. These theoretical predictions were examined in the present study by exploring DRM
false memory for trauma-related, negative, positive, and neutral lists. Given that significant
differences in BAS ratings per list type were uncovered, it was important to control for BAS
in free recall and recognition performance.
We found that participants falsely recalled the CL significantly more often for CSA and
negative lists than for positive lists. Participants also recalled significantly more CSA list
associates than associates of all other list types. These findings suggest greater thematic
processing of CSA lists compared to positive and neutral lists on our free recall task. The
findings are consistent with those of Howe (2007) and Brainerd et al. (2008b, 2010) in
suggesting that negative emotional DRM lists have denser semantic relations or result in
greater gist processing compared to positive lists, but our results add that CSA lists were
also particularly prone to false memory in free recall both for our CSA and nonCSA groups.
(Unfortunately, many of the CSA words we included have not been normed in such a way as
to permit calculation of semantic density. Moreover, our CSA lists were rated as higher in
arousal than the other lists, which may have also affected the pattern of results.)
For recognition, signal detection analyses presented a strikingly different picture. CSA lists
enjoyed the highest d’ scores, indicating they produced the least false memory compared to
other list types. Previous research indicates that positive affect can increase gist processing
(Gasper & Clore, 2002; Storbeck & Clore, 2005), which in the case of the DRM task, may
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lead to lower d’ scores. It is also possible that the nature of the CSA words (e.g., rape,
molest, hump), being rather startling and/or taboo to the average person and trauma-related
for the CSA victims, led to greater item-specific processing than did the other lists,
including the negative lists. The words were likely surprising for our participants to hear in a
scientific study, perhaps leading to greater item-specific processing and thus better memory
on the recognition test.
We are not the first to report divergent findings for DRM-task recall and recognition of
emotional lists. Howe (2007) also obtained opposite results for recall and recognition
involving emotional DRM lists. However, in his study, children were least likely to report
true and false negative information in free recall. In contrast, A′ scores in the Howe (2007)
study indicated that it was more difficult to discriminate negative than neutral information in
recognition. It is possible that the CSA lists we constructed resulted in greater relational
processing for free recall, but also motivated more item-specific processing for recognition,
especially to the extent that DRM false memory errors are generated at test. Inverse findings
for recall and recognition are not uncommon in memory studies generally, with free recall
often based more on semantic knowledge, and recognition based more on item-specific
processing (e.g., see Goodman, 1980).
Response bias is also of interest in DRM false memory research, perhaps especially when
traumatized individuals exposed to trauma-related information are included. According to
Windmann and Krueger (1998), trauma victims should have a tendency to respond “old” to
trauma-related information (a lax response criterion). These researchers argue that everyone
is evolutionarily primed to give special attention to trauma-related information via amygdala
activation because such responses promote survival, but that traumatized individuals
overinterpret many nontrauma-related stimuli as trauma related. In contrast to this proposal,
in the present study, no significant differences in response bias emerged. It is possible,
however, that although the stimuli we employed did not elicit a lax response bias in CSA
victims, other stimuli might do so. Moreover, although the effect was not significant,
participants with higher PTSD scores had particularly lax response biases for CSA lists.
It was also hypothesized that participants with CSA histories, particularly if they showed
symptoms of PTSD, would perform better (i.e., display fewer false memories) than nonCSA
controls on trauma-related DRM lists, but worse on nontrauma-related DRM lists. This
expectation was based on previous research indicating that trauma victims have a memory
bias that supports accurate memory for trauma-related information, but creates a memory
deficit for positive and neutral information (e.g., McNally et al., 1998; Vrana et al., 1995).
However, the predicted pattern was not found. Significant differences may have failed to
emerge because the trauma-related lists were related to sex, and were therefore attention
grabbing, distinctive, and relevant to all of the participants. Another possibility is that CSA
per se or greater traumatization do not necessarily lead to the development of fear networks
(Foa & Kozak, 1986) or trauma-related expertise (Castel, McCabe, Roediger, & Heitman,
2007; Chi, 1978) sufficient to affect DRM false memory for the trauma-related word lists we
constructed. It should be noted, in any case, that maltreatment victims’ basic memory
processes, including on DRM tests, often do not significantly differ from those of
nonmaltreated controls (Howe et al., 2006).
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Regarding developmental differences, adolescents would be expected to evince less false
memory than adults to the extent that they might be less familiar with some of the words we
presented. Alternatively, adolescents were anticipated to exhibit more false memories than
adults on our DRM task given possible deficits in memory monitoring. In fact, however, the
main effect of age was not significant in this regard. Overall, adolescents’ false memory
performance did not differ significantly from that of adults. The lack of a straightforward
developmental difference may be understandable given the study did not include young
children. That is, failure to find significant age differences may be related to the age range of
participants included in this research. From the perspective of fuzzy trace theory,
adolescents should already have the ability to abstract gist and might therefore be just as
likely to report false memory as adults (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998). Moreover, adolescents’
associative networks for the words used in the present research were likely to be relatively
similar to those of adults. Although, arguably, adolescents on average may know less about
sexuality than adults do, the adolescents’ associative structure for the words on our lists may
have been sufficiently similar to those of adults to eliminate age effects overall. Memory
monitoring skills are also likely to be fairly well developed by adolescence, at least absent
vulnerabilities that might delay such development. However, a developmental difference
that was apparent in our data concerned memory for associates: Adolescents recalled fewer
associates than did adults. Thus, a developmental difference in true memory for presented
words emerged, consistent with typical developmental trends of better memory performance
with age.
In relation to emotional lists specifically, Howe (2007) predicted that children would form
false memories for emotional material earlier than for neutral material. This prediction was
based on the notion that the necessary associative structures required to form false memories
are available earlier for emotional information (Pollack & Kistler, 2002). It is likely that by
age 14 associative structures necessary for false memory for both emotional and neutral
information are already formed. Developmental differences as a function of list type might
have emerged in the present research if younger children had been tested, but the sexually
explicit nature of the stimuli prevented inclusion of young children.
We were particularly interested in possible interactive effects of age, CSA status, and PTSD
on DRM false memory, especially given past findings of greater error on DRM tasks for
adults with PTSD who report histories of CSA (Bremner et al., 2000; Zoellner et al., 2000).
Of note, a significant interaction emerged between age, CSA status, and PTSD, such that for
youth who exhibited more PTSD symptoms, those with CSA histories evinced more false
memory in free recall than same-age controls. CSA-group adolescents with high PTSD
symptomology also false alarmed on the recognition test to critical lures more than did
CSA-group adolescents with fewer PTSD symptoms. These findings are consistent with
previous research suggesting that PTSD subsequent to childhood trauma is associated with
memory monitoring deficits (Golier et al., 2002; McNally et al., 1998). In the current study,
PTSD was also related to less adequate memory monitoring regarding free recall of
additional, nonpresented (nonCL) words for CSA lists. However, specifically for false
memory of CLs, the deficits associated with CSA and PTSD were restricted to adolescents,
who generally may have deficits in memory monitoring skills compared to adults. One
might expect gist processing and associative strength to be, if anything, higher for adults
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than adolescents (leading to more false memory with age), but that memory monitoring
skills might still be developing, which could lead to greater false memory for adolescents
than adults, particularly if childhood trauma is associated with delays in development.
Especially if CSA history, PTSD, and younger age each are associated with potential deficits
in memory monitoring, their combination may lead to greater error on the DRM task--a
developmental delay that was no longer apparent for our adult participants with CSA
histories and PTSD symptoms. This interpretation seems to offer the most parsimonious
explanation of our findings.
Finally, it was of interest to examine attachment style, which has been empirically linked to
DRM false memory. Fearful avoidance was associated with less effective memory
monitoring, regardless of CSA history. Specifically, individuals who exhibited stronger
tendencies toward fearful avoidance recalled more nonpresented nonCL words for CSA
lists. This finding is consistent with previous research in which individuals with more secure
attachments demonstrated superior cognitive functioning (e.g., Fraley et al., 2000; Ogle,
2010). It is also consistent with findings that attachment avoidance is associated with greater
memory error for stressful information in particular (Chae et al., 2009)--in the present case,
words associated with CSA.
Future Directions: Methodological Concerns and New Translational Research
We would like to offer a number of suggestions for future research on CSA and the DRM
task. First, regarding methodology, future research should include a larger sample size than
was encompassed in our study; the relatively small number of participants we tested may
have resulted in an inability to detect certain predicted interactions. It will also be important
to determine if our findings replicate with a larger sample. Furthermore, researchers should
consider presenting the word lists by category rather than in a random order, the latter of
which might disrupt trauma-related processing. Moreover, future DRM studies with CSA
lists should include the more typical DRM procedure for counterbalancing of targets and
distractors on the recognition test. This was not possible in the present experiment because
of the need for a sufficient number of word lists to be presented in each category. Valence
and arousal ratings could vary for CSA and nonCSA groups, and thus future researchers
should obtain ratings from CSA groups as well as nonCSA groups.
Second, continued translational research on trauma and memory generally, including DRM
performance specifically, is needed. Considerable debate centers on whether DRM false
memory findings are generalizable to legal cases or justify application of specific memory
development theories to the legal context (Brainerd, Reyna, & Zember, in press; Freyd &
Gleaves, 1996; Gallo, 2010; Pezdek & Lam, 2007). In our view, new translational research
should determine quite directly if DRM findings for CSA victims are applicable to forensic
situations. One next step would be to test CSA victims on DRM lists and also on false
memory paradigms that are arguably more ecologically valid regarding forensic cases—at
least, more ecologically valid than are DRM lists. Loftus and Pickrell's (1995) “lost in the
mall” paradigm, which taps implanted false memory for childhood autobiographical events,
would be one such false memory task of considerable interest. Qin et al. (2008) examined
DRM performance and false implanted memory in college students and laypersons, finding
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a significant relation between the two tasks. Specifically, intrusion of unrelated words in free
recall on the DRM task and a more liberal response criterion in DRM recognition were
associated with false childhood autobiographical memory, suggesting a common underlying
mechanism of lax memory monitoring. This was found despite the fact that nonemotional
DRM lists were used, whereas false childhood memories dealt with more emotional
material. Being younger and being a child of a fearful avoidant parent also predicted
implanted false memory scores, and participants’ own attachment styles (greater avoidance)
predicted their performance on the DRM task (regarding a more liberal response bias).
Conducting a similar study to that of Qin et al. (2008) with CSA victims would be on point.
Bremner et al. (2000) previously found that women with CSA histories and PTSD diagnoses
(versus women with CSA histories but without PTSD diagnoses) showed increased DRM
memory error regarding recognition memory for additional (new) words. However, their
study did not include an ecologically valid false memory measure to test the generalizability
of their findings to forensically relevant false memory tasks. Of note, spontaneous false
memory for critical lures, as tapped by the DRM task, is not what has generally predicted
implanted false memory performance in laboratory tasks. Rather, to date, memory
monitoring regarding additional, nonpresented words seems to be the more robust predictor
(but see Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lensenweger, & Pitman, 2002; Clancy et al., 2000: see
Gallo, 2010, for review).
In addition to examining the relations between DRM performance and implanted false
memory, it is also of interest to investigate relations between DRM performance and
accurate autobiographical memory in CSA victims. In a preliminary examination of this
issue, Ogle et al. (2007) explored whether DRM performance on emotional lists predicted
autobiographical memory accuracy in adolescents with and without child maltreatment
histories. No significant relations were found for DRM false memory, but free recall of
DRM list associates significantly predicted more accurate autobiographical memory. It is
possible that both tasks tapped, to a certain extent, a general characteristic of greater versus
poorer memory accuracy.
However, even when significant relations exist, they are often not sufficiently strong to
provide much guidance to the legal system. Typically, the variance explained is relatively
meager. For example, in the Ogle et al. (2007) study just mentioned, a correlation of .40 was
found between DRM accurate recall of associates and accurate autobiographical memory.
This means that the proportion of variance accounted for was only .16, leaving .84
unexplained. If legal professionals or jurors were to base decisions on such correlations, they
would inaccurately credit (or discredit) witnesses in many if not most cases. For example,
many CSA victims would likely be inaccurately judged as not credible witnesses when in
fact their memory was quite correct. In some other studies, the differences in performance
between groups were quite weak and significant only with one-tailed statistical tests
(justified by predictions). Overall, in our view, it is premature to assume that results such as
ours would generalize to false memory for autobiographical events in CSA victims and
premature to use such findings as a basis for decisions or expert testimony in actual legal
cases. Moreover, the pattern of findings differs depending on the type of test (free recall vs.
recognition). Such differences need to be understood before implications of the findings can
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be firmly drawn. We agree, however, with Brainerd et al.'s (in press) suggestion that DRM
findings (as well as findings from a subset of misleading questioning studies) indicate that
children are not always more prone to false memories than adults--a conclusion with legal
relevance--and that the DRM paradigm and variants thereof might eventually prove useful
for identifying instructions and mental processes that help children guard against false
memory formation during forensic interviews (but see Gallo, 2010).
Finally, in conclusion, research on memory for trauma-related information in maltreated
children and adults is timely given heated theoretical debates about the effects of trauma on
memory development. Moreover, translational research in this area is crucial to inform
practice. The present study provides valuable information to inform debate and application.
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Avoidance X Anxiety Interaction for Free Recall of Additional Words for CSA Lists. Avoid
= Avoidance dimension. Anx = Anxiety dimension.
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Table 1
Means (Standard Deviations) for Matching Variables
Adolescents Adults
Variable Control CSA Control CSA
SES 4.23 (1.77) 3.61 (1.59) 3.82 (1.82) 3.32 (1.32)
Ethnicity 1.38 (0.50) 1.44 (0.51) 1.32 (0.48) 1.23 (0.43)
IQ (vocabulary) .32 (.90) −.35 (.94) .02 (1.17) .03 (.90)
IQ (digit span) −.15 (1.04) .07 (.90) .20 (.85) −.13 (1.9)
PTSD criteria met −.10 (.88) .10 (1.11) −.52 (0.82) 0.52 (.90)
TSC Anxiety −.38 (.96) .39 (.94) −.44 (.60) .41 (1.13)
TSC Depression −.51 (.65) .57 (1.0) −.46 (.79) .39 (1.03)
TSC Dissociation −.40 (.87) .45 (.98) −.41 (.72) .34 (1.11)
TSC Sexual problems −.40 (.74) .42 (1.07) −.22 (.75) .19 (1.18)
Note. CSA = child sexual abuse. SES = socioeconomic status (annual income), 1 = under $15,000; 2 = $15,000 - $25,000; 3 = $25,000 - $40,000; 4
= $40,000 - $60,000; 5 = $60,000 - $90,000; 6 = over $90,000. Ethnicity: 1 = Caucasian, 0 = Other. IQ (vocabulary) is the vocabulary subscore
from the Wechsler Intelligence Test (z-scored). IQ (digit span) is the digit span subscore from the Wechsler Intelligence Test (z-scored). PTSD =
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. TSC = Trauma Symptom Checklist.
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Table 2
Means (Standard Deviations) for Free Recall of Critical Lures
Adolescents Adults
Control CSA Control CSA
Low PTSD High PTSD Low PTSD High PTSD Low PTSD High PTSD Low PTSD High PTSD
False .13 .05 .08 .16 .09 .13 .18 .10
memory (.12) (.11) (.13) (.17) (.15) (.16) (.27) (.13)
Note. CSA = child Sexual Abuse. PTSD = PTSD criteria met.
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Table 4
Means (Standard Deviations) for False Alarms to Critical Lures on the Recognition Test
Control CSA
Low PTSD High PTSD Low PTSD High PTSD
CSA .50 (.24) .42 (.17) .48 (.20) .50 (.19)
Negative .49 (.21) .53 (.21) .47 (.23) .48 (.20)
Neutral .45(.24) .44 (.20) .44 (.23) .50 (.23)
Positive .43 (.22) .51 (.28) .49 (.24) .47 (.22)
Note. CSA = child sexual abuse.
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Table 5
Means (Standard Deviations) for d' scores
Controls CSA
Low PTSD High PTSD M Low PTSD High PTSD M
CSA .49 (.89) .94 (.53) .65 (.80) a .72 (.83) .64 (.92) .67 (.88)a
Negative .06 (.66) .24 (.71) .13 (.68) b d .16 (.76) .28 (.65) .23 (.69)b
Neutral .23(.89) .62 (.84) .38 (.88) b c .51 (.79) .19 (.87) .32 (.84)b
Positive .18 (.62) −.09 (1.10) .09 (.83) b d .16 (.55) .24 (.62) .21 (.59)b
Note. CSA = child sexual abuse. PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Mean values that do not share superscripts are significantly different.
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Table 6
Means (Standard Deviations) for False Alarms
Control CSA
Low PTSD High PTSD Low PTSD High PTSD
CSA 1.47 (2.35) .59 (.31) 1.37 (3.04) .69 (.33)
Negative 1.19 (1.80) .75 (.33) 1.71 (3.02) .72 (.27)
Neutral 1.59 (3.0) .61 (.38) .96 (1.37) 1.50 (2.52)
Positive .86 (.39) 2.41 (3.58) 1.13 (1.31) .80 (.42)
Note. CSA = child sexual abuse. PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictor Variables in Regression
Predictor variables Mean Standard deviation
Age 18.11 4.60
CSA status 0.51 0.50
Avoidance (z score) 0.00 1.00
Anxiety (z score) 0.00 1.00
Externalization 52.81 10.45
Internalization 51.73 10.94
State anxiety (z score) 0.00 .97
Psychopathology (z score) −0.01 0.81
Anxiety X avoidance (z score) 0.22 0.94
Note. FA = false alarms. CL = critical lure.
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Table 8
Correlations among Predictors and DRM Dependent Variables for CSA Word Lists (N =88-93)
Predictors FA CL free recall Associates free recall Add. words free recall FA CL recog d' β
Age −.05
.23
* −.12 −.01 .15 −.08
CSA status −.04 −.09 .07 .06 .01 −.05
Avoidance .04 .00 .13 .14 .00 −.18
Anxiety .02 −.14 .15 .10 −.15 −.18
Externalization .00 −.18 .18 .05 −.16 −.05
Internalization .06 −.20 .20 .01 −.03 −.09
State anxiety .08 −.14 .12 .11 −.17 −.03






Avoidance X anxiety .02 .06
.21
* .03 .17 .14
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Table 9
Intercorrelations among Predictors (N = 88 - 93)
Predictors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Age
2. CSA status .02



























































10. Anx X avoid .11 −.01 .01
−.32
** −.14 −.08 −.06 −.08 .07
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